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Abstract 
 
The empirical relationship between pharmaceutical industry revenues and pharmaceutical industry innova-
tion is estimated, allowing for an exploration of the impact of the Medicaid rebate program, a form of price 
regulation.  Using the empirical results, the opportunity cost of the Medicaid rebate program is found to be 
as high as four new drug approvals annually.  Given the increased interest in a Medicare drug benefit, regu-
lators should be aware of the hidden cost of price regulation for pharmaceuticals. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
reakthrough medicines and vaccines played a central role in the twentieth century's unprecedented ad-
vances in the treatment of many fatal diseases in the United States.  Yet, despite their obvious connec-
tion to the health of the general public, the development of new drugs is chiefly a private enterprise.  
In the U.S., the new drug discovery process relies heavily on research and development (R&D) investment by phar-
maceutical companies.  These private firms base their decisions to invest on the risks and returns associated with 
drug development. 
 
The costs of drug discovery and development have increased over time (PhRMA, 2000b), and the risks of 
failure are quite high.  On average, only three out of ten approved drugs recover average R&D costs (PhRMA 
2000b), and in 1998 private investors suffered $5 billion losses from unsuccessful investments in biotech and phar-
maceutical R&D (Spitzer, 1999).  Due in part to increased research and development costs, increases in drug prices 
have outpaced increases in the general price level in recent years. 
 
As pharmaceutical prices have risen, government interest in controlling the price of pharmaceutical prod-
ucts has grown, particularly for drugs purchased under the auspices of government funded health programs/agencies.  
Government, at both federal and state levels, is a major purchaser of pharmaceuticals, through the Medicaid pro-
gram, Department of Veterans Affairs, Department of Defense, and various other programs.  Most government pro-
grams that cover prescription drugs mandate various forms of price controls, including rebates, discounts, caps on 
prices and limits on price increases.  Recently, some politicians have proposed expanded Medicare drug coverage 
for elderly Americans coupled with price regulation of drugs, but little is known about the long-run consequences of 
price regulation on drug discovery and approval. 
   
Economists have long known that price controls may have negative consequences.  One important but rare-
ly studied consequence is a change the incentive to invest in R&D.  Since Solow's seminal 1957 article, which 
showed that ninety percent of the of the doubling of per capita nonfarm output in the United States over the period 
1909-1949 was due to technical advance, the importance of technological innovation in the economy has been 
known.  Thus, an examination of consequences of price regulation on the pace of technological progress in the 
pharmaceutical industry is in order 
1
 
 
In this paper, the relationship between U.S. pharmaceutical industry revenues and industry innovation will 
be considered.   Using information about this relationship,  the estimates will be used to predict the cumulative effect 
 
____________________ 
Readers with comments or questions are encouraged to contact the authors via email. 
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of rebates received by Medicaid from drug manufacturers on pharmaceutical innovation in the U.S.  The analysis 
will begin with a review of the relevant literature, followed by a discussion of the empirical model and data.  Finally, 
the empirical results will be presented, and the implications will be explored. 
 
2. Literature Review:  Pharmaceutical Regulation 
 
As mentioned above, governmental entities seek to control the price paid for pharmaceutical products in a 
number of programs.  The most noteworthy is the Medicaid rebate program, where rebates totally over $3.9 billion 
were issued in 2000.  The program and its relationship to drug prices will be examined below, followed by a discus-
sion of regulation related to the drug discovery process. 
 
2.1. Price Regulation Through Medicaid Rebates and Pharmaceutical Innovation 
 
Established in 1990, the Medicaid rebate includes two key provisions:  a most-favored-customer (MFC) 
clause governing prices for pharmaceutical products supplied to Medicaid recipients and a basic rebate of at least 
15.1 percent of the wholesale price of brand-name drugs.  The effect of the program on prices may be mixed.  On 
one hand, economic theory suggests that most-favored-customer clauses commit firms to compete less aggressively 
in prices, implying that prices and firm profits should rise in the face of a MFC clause.  In contrast, the basic rebate 
should lower prices and firm profits.  Given the opposing effects on price, it is not clear a priori how the program 
will affect firm profits. 
  
Several authors have modeled the effect of negotiated or regulated prices on firm behavior in the pharma-
ceutical industry by focusing on pricing strategies and profitability, each of which may affect the degree of innova-
tion in the industry.  Elzinga and Mills (1997) model the effect of intervention by hospitals and managed care organ-
izations on prices to all consumers for prescription drugs.  They show that prescription drug pricing influenced by 
managed care may result in lower prices for some consumers at the sole expense of pharmaceutical firms, where re-
duced drug prices lower drug company profits.  While not discussed by the authors, this model would presumably 
result in lower levels of industry innovation due to a reduction in retained earnings.  In contrast, Morton (1997) 
looks explicitly at the effect of Medicaid rebates on pharmaceutical prices for different classes of drugs.  In tests of 
her theoretical model, she finds that the effects of the rebate program are small and relatively weak, with no effect 
for drugs with patent protection.  Thus, her study implies that for newly patented drugs, the law had little immediate 
effect on firm profitability.  In sum, price caps appear to reduce firm prices, which is consistent with strong industry 
opposition to price controls (PhRMA, 2000a).
 2 
 
Given estimates of the price elasticity demand for pharmaceuticals, which range from approximately 0.1 to 
0.3 in absolute value, decreases in the per unit price of pharmaceutical products will decrease firm revenue, which in 
turn may negatively influence earnings, R&D, and drug innovation.
3
 Indeed, a study conducted by the department of 
Health and Human Services (1994) examined the relationship between spending controls and pharmaceutical re-
search and development in Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and France.  In these countries, lower drug 
prices were found to weaken incentives for pharmaceutical research and development, where a 1 percent decrease in 
drug prices leads to 0.68 percent decrease in research and development spending.
4 
 
2.2. FDA Regulation in the Drug Discovery Process 
 
Drug discovery is a complex, risky and time-consuming process, involving a great deal of regulation by the 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which imposes strict requirements on drug testing and development.  
On average drug companies spend $500 million and 12-15 years of research and clinical trials to bring a new medi-
cine to market (PhRMA, 2001a). 
  
Innovation in the industry may be measured at several stages in the drug development process. 
   
1. At the end of the basic research stage (also known as pre-clinical testing stage) a firm is required to file a 
Commercial Investigational New Drug (IND) Application with the FDA before beginning human testing of 
The Journal of Applied Business Research Volume 18, Number 4 
 89 
the new medicine.  In the 1990s, this stage took approximately 3.8 years (DiMasi, 2001). 
2. After completing three phases of clinical trials, if the drug is safe, a firm may submit a New Drug Applica-
tion (NDA) to the FDA.  This stage took an average of 8.6 years in the 1990s (DiMasi, 2001). 
3. In the final stage, the FDA approval process results in New Chemical Entities (NCE), a subset of the larger 
class of New Drug Approvals (NDAs).  NDAs include several types of new drugs and drug delivery sys-
tems:  NCEs, New Indications, New Dosage Forms, New Dosing Regimens, and New Routes of Adminis-
tration.  In the 1990s this was by far the shortest and least expensive stage, lasting less than 1.8 years on 
average (DiMasi, 2001) and accounting for less than five percent of all research and development expendi-
tures (PhRMA, 2001b). 
 
Since 1938, pharmaceutical manufacturers have been required to provide scientific proof of product safety 
before putting drugs on the market.  In 1962, Congress added two additional regulatory restrictions:  a proof-of-
efficacy requirement for new drug approval and additional requirements for testing Investigational New Drugs 
(Grabowski & Vernon, 1983; Comanor, 1986).
 5
 These new regulations resulted in a more costly and lengthy drug 
development process and intensified concerns about the impact of regulation on new drug discovery (Comanor, 
1986). 
 
Since 1962, there has been a decline in annual new drug introductions accompanied by strong upward 
trends in the cost, time, and risk associated with pharmaceutical R&D (Hansen, 1979; DiMasi, Hansen, Grabowski, 
and Lasagna, 1991).  The average time from clinical trials to FDA approval of drugs in the late 1960s and the 1970s 
was about six years, but by the 1980s this process took an average of nine years (DiMasi, Hansen, Grabowski, and 
Lasagna, 1991).  In addition, time spent in the pre-clinical and clinical phases of development increased from 9.5 
years in 1970s to 12.7 years from 1990-1996 (PhRMA, 2000b).   
 
Since the 1984, three noteworthy legislative changes have reduced the burden of regulation and/or in-
creased the payoff to research and development.  First, in 1984, Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and 
Patent Term Restoration Act, permitting research-based companies to apply for up to five years of additional patent 
protection for new medicines.  This change increased the benefits associated with bringing a new drug to market, 
compensating firms for time lost to the FDA review and approval process. 
   
Second, a 1988 regulatory revision expanded patients’ access to experimental therapies for serious diseases 
with no approved effective treatment, like HIV.  This change shortened the drug review process and is likely to have 
increased the number of Commercial Investigational New Drug Applications. 
 
Finally, in 1992, Congress passed the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA), where pharmaceutical 
companies agreed to pay more than $325 million in user fees to the FDA in exchange for a more timely review 
process.  Between 1993 and 1997, these fees were used to hire 660 new reviewers (Wechsler, 2001), resulting in a 
50 percent reduction in the approval time for New Chemical Entities (Tufts Center, 1999).  This legislation is likely 
to have increased the number of New Drug Applications, New Drug Approvals, and New Chemical Entity Approv-
als. 
 
3. Data and Empirical Model 
 
As the literature review reveals, price regulation, in the form of rebates, is likely to negatively influence in-
novation in the pharmaceutical industry.  To examine the effect of Medicaid rebates on various measures of industry 
innovation in the U.S., the relationship between pharmaceutical industry revenues and industry innovation will be 
estimated.  After empirically establishing this relationship, the effect of Medicaid rebates on innovation will be ex-
amined. 
 
Several measures of innovative outputs in the pharmaceutical industry will be considered:  Commercial In-
vestigational New Drug Applications, New Drug Applications, New Drug Approvals, and New Chemical Entities.  
As discussed above, these innovations reflect different stages of the R&D process and/or indicate different types of 
innovations.  Inputs into the production of the number of innovations include firm level spending on research and 
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development, which in turn is influenced by sales and retained earnings.  Data on drug applications and approvals 
were taken from annual reports and statistical reports of the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research and the FDA 
website.  Annual domestic pharmaceutical industry sales and domestic R&D expenditures were taken from the 2000 
Pharmaceutical Industry Profile, published by the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America 
(PhRMA).
6
  
 
Graphs 1 and 2 show the number of innovations in each year, where data are available from 1970-2000 for 
New Drug Approvals, New Drug Applications, and New Chemical Entities, and data are available from 1983-2000 
for Commercial Investigational New Drug Applications.  Two key policy regime shifts are indicated on Graph 1, in 
1984 and 1992.  As discussed above, in 1984 the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act was 
passed, which allowed for additional patent protection, and in 1992 the Prescription Drug User Fee Act was passed, 
which allowed for shortened drug review time.  Both acts may increase applications and approvals by increasing the 
amount of time drug companies have to recoup research and development costs.  For Commercial INDs, a single 
regulatory shift is noted on Graph 2, where in 1988 regulation expanded patients’ access to experimental therapies 
for serious diseases with no approved effective treatment.  These three policy changes are incorporated into the em-
pirical model, discussed below, using binary indicator measures equal to zero prior to the regulatory change and one 
otherwise. 
 
Domestic U.S. sales in the industry and domestic R&D spending are shown in Graph 3.  Both have been 
increasing over time at an increasing rate.  An empirical investigation of the relationship between sales and research 
and development reveals a very strong correlation between the two variables, where a one dollar increase in R&D 
spending is associated with a $3.84 increase in sales.  Thus, sales alone are used in the subsequent analysis.
7 
 
Graph 1:  Annual Number of Pharmaceutical Innovations
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Graph 3:  Annual Industry Sales and R & D (U.S. in Millions $)
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Innovation at time t may depend on real sales over a number of periods: 
 
  



m
j
jjt
n
i
iit SalesgeBinaryPolicyChanInnovation
01
 (1) 
 
where n = 2 for ND Approvals, ND Applications, and NCEs and n = 1 for Commercial INDs; and m is the optimal 
number of current and lagged values of sales to be included in the specification. 
   
Given that regression analysis can produce spurious results when variables contain stochastic trends (Gran-
ger and Newbold, 1974; Phillips, 1986), the data are examined for unit roots (i.e. stochastic trends) using standard 
Phillips-Perron (1988) tests.
8
 The results presented in Table 1 reveal that the hypothesis of a unit root cannot be re-
jected for New Chemical Entities Approved, Commercial Investigational New Drug Applications Filed, and Domes-
tic U.S. Sales.
9
 Although the variables are governed by stochastic trends, if there exists a linear combination of them 
which is stationary and they are integrated of the same order, then they are cointegrated and share a common sto-
chastic trend (Hamilton,1994).  For example, use of the Engle and Granger (1987) procedure to test for cointegration 
reveals that pharmaceutical sales and research and development are cointegrated, an intuitive result.  However, sales 
is not cointegrated with any of the innovation measures. 
 
Table 1: Phillips-Perron Tests for Unit Roots 
  
New Chemical 
Entities  
Approved 
New Drug  
Applications  
Approved 
New Drug  
Applications 
Filed 
Commercial  
Investigational 
New Drug  
Applications 
Filed 
Natural Log  
Total Domestic 
U.S. Sales   
Test P-value P-value P-value P-value P-value 
PP no intercept 0.3970 0.6360 0.3720 0.6640  
PP intercept only 0.1340 0.0060 ** 0.0190 ** 0.4560 0.9910 
PP intercept + trend     0.9490 
PP differenced with intercept 0.0010 ** 0.0010 ** 0.0010 ** 0.0010 ** 0.0070 ** 
Note:  The null hypothesis is that the series is non-stationary.  Two stars indicate significance at the one percent level, and one 
star indicates significance at the five percent level. 
 
 
Since the hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected for New Chemical Entities Approved, Commercial 
Investigational New Drug Applications Filed, and Domestic U.S. Sales, the proper specification should involve re-
gressing the first difference of each innovation on the first difference of sales.  For ease of interpretation, the natural 
log of each variable is taken before taking the first difference, and the first difference of all innovation variables is 
taken.  Thus, equation one is modified as follows: 
 
  



m
j
jtjt
n
i
ii SalesgeBinaryPolicyChanInnovation
01
  (2) 
 
where n = 2 for ND Approvals, ND Applications, and NCEs and n = 1 for Commercial INDs;  m is the optimal 
number of current and lagged values of sales to be included in the specification, where the optimal lag length for 
sales is determined by the Akaike Information Criteria (Akaike, 1973);  indicates the first difference; and all inno-
vations and sales are in natural logs.   
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4. Empirical Results 
 
The empirical results are contained in Table 2.  A small number of lags of sales is sufficient to characterize 
the relationship between each innovation and sales.  The sum of estimated coefficients on sales growth and lagged 
sales growth is the elasticity, where the sum is uniformly positive.  For example, for New Drug Applications Filed, 
the optimal specification includes current domestic sales growth and one lagged value of sales growth, where a one 
percent increase in the growth rate of sales implies a 2.65 percent increase in the growth rate of NDAs filed.  Sales 
growth has the largest impact on growth in Commercial Investigational New Drug Applications and New Drug Ap-
plications Approved, but the coefficients are jointly significant only for the latter innovation measure.  This may be 
due to the smaller sample for INDs.  The changes in government regulation in 1984 and 1992 significantly affected 
New Drug Approvals in a positive manner, where the change in 1992 had a larger effect on increasing New Drug 
Approvals. 
   
Table 2:  Pharmaceutical Innovation Estimates 
  
New Chemical Enti-
ties  
Approved 
  
New Drug Applica-
tions Approved 
  
New Drug Applica-
tions 
 Filed 
  
Commercial Investiga-
tional New Drug Appli-
cations 
 Filed 
 
Policy Change beginning 1984 0.4515  0.4113 * -0.0217   
Policy Change beginning 1988       0.0734 
Policy Change beginning 1992 -0.0945  0.4989 ** -0.0406   
US Sales in Millions ($) t 1.0741  2.8999 ** 0.7092  0.5605 
US Sales in Millions ($) t-1     1.9409 ** -0.0052 
US Sales in Millions ($) t-2       1.4342 ** 
US Sales in Millions ($) t-3       0.9494 
        
Sum of Coefficients on Sales 1.0741  2.8999 ** 2.6501 ** 2.9389 
        
Number of Observations 30  29  29  17 
R2 0.547  0.145  0.283  0.634 
Akaike Information Criteria -52.899  -76.434  -81.908  -70.483 
Note:  US Sales is the first difference of the natural log of US Sales.  Each of the Innovation variables is the first difference of the 
natural log. Two stars indicates significance at the one percent level, and one star indicates significance at the five percent level, 
using two-tailed t-tests for the individual coefficients and F-tests for the joint significance of the coefficients on sales. 
 
 
The results reveal that limiting sales growth through price regulation will have a negative effective on the 
growth of industry innovation.  For example, if one assumed that the entire amount of the rebate would be added 
back to sales in the absence of the Medicaid rebate program, the average growth rate of sales in the 1992-2000 pe-
riod would be increased from an average of 7.56 percent annually to 8.05 percent annually, as shown in Table 3.  
That reduction in the growth rate of sales due to the Medicaid rebates translates into a reduction in the growth rate of 
innovation. 
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Using values for average sales and innovations over the 1991-2000 period and the estimated coefficients in 
Table 2, one can predict the number of innovations lost due to the rebate program in an average year.  For example, 
approximately four fewer new drug applications were approved each year, on average, than would have been ap-
proved if industry sales were increased by the amount of the rebate to Medicaid.   
 
5. Discussion 
 
Price controls for a Medicare Drug Benefit are strongly opposed by the pharmaceutical industry, where 
new price regulation associated with a Medicare drug benefit would increase the portion of the U.S. market covered 
by price controls from fourteen percent to over forty percent (PhRMA, 2000a).  An examination of the relationship 
between sales growth and innovation growth in the industry demonstrates that increasing sales increases innovation 
in the industry.  An understanding of the link between sales and innovation is crucial given the long drug discovery 
process and the limited life of patents. 
   
The model provides a rough estimate of the opportunity cost of the Medicaid rebate program, where as 
many as four new drug approvals annually were lost due to the Medicaid rebate program.  Some of the more con-
servative estimates of the effects of pharmaceutical innovation on health imply that a one-time R&D expenditure of 
about $15 billion (which is less than the amount of domestic pharmaceutical R&D in 1997) subsequently saves 1.6 
million life-years per year, whose annual value is about $27 billion (Lichtenberg, 1998).  Given that the social rate 
of return on pharmaceutical innovation appears to be quite high and the drug discovery process is quite long, addi-
tional price regulation in the industry may have a significant negative effect on current and future public health.  
 
6. Suggestions for Future Research 
 
The model presented above is suggestive of the macroeconomic effects of a specific type of price regula-
tion in the pharmaceutical industry.  However, the reduction in innovation is clearly occurring at the margin, and the 
reduction may be different for different classes of drugs.  Future research should focus on the effect of price regula-
tion on therapeutic groups or other classifications of pharmaceuticals to discover which drug classes are impacted 
most.  In addition, the negative effects of price regulation may be offset to some degree by reductions in drug devel-
opment time.  More research needs to be done on the effect of reductions in drug development time on innovation in 
the industry.   
Table 3: Predicted Pharmaceutical Innovation Estimates without Rebates 
Average Annual Growth in Sales in Millions (1992-2000) 7.5577% 
Estimated Average Annual Growth in Sales in Millions with Rebates (1992-2000) 8.0548% 
Estimated Effect of Rebate on Annual Growth Rate of:  
New Chemical Entities Approved -0.5339% 
New Drug Applications Approved -1.4416% 
New Drug Applications Filed -1.3174% 
Commercial Investigational New Drug Applications Filed -1.4609% 
Estimated Effect of Rebate on Annual Number of Innovations:  
New Chemical Entities Approved -0.26 
New Drug Applications Approved -4.13 
New Drug Applications Filed -1.24 
Commercial Investigational New Drug Applications Filed -4.17 
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End Notes 
 
1. It is hard to say that regulation-reducing innovation results in dynamic welfare losses, as there may be too 
much innovation in the competitive case.  This paper endeavors to examine the potential effects of regula-
tion on innovation, and the value of that innovation should be the subject of future research.   
2. Genuardi, Stiller, and Trapnell (1996) and the Congressional Budget Office (1996) find some evidence that 
Medicaid rebates have coincided with a reduction in pharmaceutical discounts to some private third-party 
payers, even though average prices have fallen.  While the rebates are likely to be welfare-reducing, an in-
vestigation into the distributional consequences of the rebate program are beyond the scope of this paper. 
3. The elasticity estimates are from Folland, Goodman, and Stano (2001).  Alexander, Flynn, and Linkins 
(1994) compute a price elasticity of demand for prescription drugs at a national level.  For the U.S., they 
find that demand is relatively elastic (2.8), and the authors credit relatively little insurance coverage for 
prescription drugs during the period examined.  However, the demand for prescription drugs for individuals 
covered by Medicaid is likely to be much more inelastic, given that Medicaid provides a generous drug 
benefit to beneficiaries with very low copayments and no deductibles (Cook, 1999). 
4. In general, price regulation may not succeed in controlling drug spending, as was the case in four countries 
that implemented price regulation (GAO, 1994).  Moreover, the GAO report argued that the effects of a 
price reduction in Canada and European countries may differ significantly from the effects of similar price 
reductions in the U.S., since these countries represent a relatively small share of global pharmaceutical 
market.    
5. The law required firms to provide results of clinical tests on animals and research protocols for clinical tri-
als to the FDA prior to testing in humans. 
6. Only ethical pharmaceuticals are included in sales and R&D measures.  Domestic U.S. Sales are reported 
net of rebates and discounts, and they include sales by research-based companies within the United States.  
Domestic U.S. R&D includes expenditures within the United States by research-based companies. 
7. While the pharmaceutical industry is increasingly multinational in scope, historically, the U.S. has been the 
largest producer of drug development and innovation.  Both U.S.-owned and foreign-owned research-based 
companies spent almost $22.5 billion on R&D within the United States in 2000, accounting for approx-
imately thirty-six percent of global pharmaceutical R&D (PhRMA, 2000b).  Sales and Medicaid rebates 
have been converted to 1996 dollars using the GDP deflator for use in the subsequent analysis. 
8. The unit root tests examine each time series to determine whether the time series being examined is statio-
nary, i.e. whether the underlying stochastic process that generated the series can be assume to be invariant 
with respect to time. 
9. Note that the goal of unit root tests is to find a parsimonious representation that gives a reasonable approx-
imation to the true process, as opposed to determining whether or not the true process is literally I(1). 
(Hamilton, 1994).  Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests were also conducted and yielded similar results. 
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